



CONSENT for Europe

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. EDITORS' COLUMN

II. GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE UPCOMING SCHOOLS

III. SUMMARY ON THE FIRST PHD SCHOOL

IV. ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE BUDAPEST PHD SCHOOL

V. AWARD-WINNER PAPERS IN THE YEAR OF 2005/2006

The various kinds of the PhD Schools have become very fashionable and effective in the EU countries and every year dozens of doctoral schools have been organized at different universities. The opportunities and responsibilities of the "networks of excellence" like the EU-Consent have been bigger in organizing PhD Schools, since they have been supposed to establish networks at all levels of research and especially the PhD network has been one of the most important network through which they can fulfil their mission. Given the special character of the EU-Consent as a FP6 project – Wider Europe, Deeper Integration? Constructing Europe Network – its mission statement has to be built on two pillars: (1) problematizing the relationship between deepening and widening through discussing the deep impact of the latest enlargement on the former member states and envisaging the emerging EU25 and (2) constructing an all European network of scholars in the European Studies by bridging the gap between the old and new member states in this respect.

The special profile of the doctoral school in the EU-Consent comes of necessity from this mission statement. First, the PhD Schools focus upon the unified Europe of the EU25 and the vital issue of the relationship between widening and

deepening comes to the fore in research and scholarship for the doctoral students. Second, the PhD Schools have to contribute to the emerging Common European Research Space through the creation of common conceptual framework and methodological foundation for the present and future generation of scholars, and in a multidisciplinary way, by combining the approaches from political science, economics, law, history, sociology and other social science disciplines. The Common European Research Space could exist only as a network of several networks, and the EU-Consent by creating its own network connects all participants to the other networks as well that facilitates both research and career promotion of the PhD students in a unified Europe.

The PhD Schools at the EU-Consent vary the topics and venues, since they concentrate on several aspects of the EU studies and they move from city to city, from country to country and from university to university. It leads to a fertile socialization effect among the PhD students, since the students are coming from many member states and different disciplines. The changing venues in the subsequent doctoral schools give an excellent opportunity not just to get acquainted with each other but also to learn about a given country and city, so

the “local studies” are important parts of the curriculum and they have a place in the programmes. The PhD students should get a lot of information about the widening Europe from books and papers, and the doctoral schools open up an opportunity to be better informed at the

theoretical level, but it is equally important to see other member states through their own eyes, to have friends and personal experiences in other countries which will facilitate the collective European identity.



The Doctoral Schools are integral parts of the EU-CONSENT network of excellence. They are designed to provide transnational training for doctoral students and to create lasting networks of young researchers. Six Doctoral Schools will be held during the lifetime of the project in EU-CONSENT partner institutions. Five of them will be attached to work packages; the sixth school has been left open for summarising the experiences and closing the training process. The Steering Group has decided on the following themes connected with the Work Packages:

1. EU Institutions and Political Actors (WP IV,; date: 1-5 May 2006 in Budapest)

2. Constructing Europe (WP II/III, expected date: 19-25 February 2007 in Dublin)

3. Political and Security Aspects of the EU (WP VII, expected date: April 2007 in Cambridge)

4. Democracy, Legitimacy and Identities (WP V, expected date: Autumn of 2007)

5. Economic and Social Policies (WP VI, expected date: Spring of 2008)

6. Closing PhD School in Cologne

It is important to develop a CONSENT model for the PhD Schools. Each School should have the following elements:

- (1) general theoretical approaches,
- (2) student papers,
- (3) methodological training and
- (4) discussion of the specific WP topic.

The first element should take about one day and involve presentations by senior academics on relevant theoretical approaches. It should include broad social science and integration theories. The second element is the paper presentation by each doctoral student, responded to by a senior academic and/or one of the other PhD students, taking the afternoon all days. This will assist doctoral students in presenting and defending their arguments and provide them with input from scholars beyond their home university. The third, training element should focus on the different methodological approaches. Even if the doctoral students do not work with these methodologies, it is important that they are exposed to the variety of approaches that have been deployed in the social sciences. This element should take half a day, which would allow for two presentations. Last but not least about one and half days have been left for the fourth element, the WP specific topic that goes also through the whole course in its specific way. The Schools will be held for a week, with an arrival on Saturday and leaving an excursion day for Sunday, with the closure of the course on Friday.



III. SUMMARY ON THE FIRST PHD SCHOOL

The first PhD School

The first PhD School was organized in Budapest jointly by the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) and Budapest Corvinus University. The theme of summer school was the impact of EU enlargement on the institutions of the European Union. The week of the PhD school consisted in equal parts of senior researchers invited to give lectures, and of the participants presenting and discussing their own research. As part of the PhD school every participant presented his or her own research. In addition to presenting a paper based on the doctoral research carried out, each participant was also expected to act as a discussant to another presentation, and to contribute to the general discussion of paper presentations throughout the school.

Brief summary from Thomas Christiansen

Participants

We received 21 applications for the 20 places we had available for the school. One paper proposal was rejected due to the topic being outside the focus of the Phd school. Of the 20 accepted applicants, 17 participants submitted their papers in advance and then did actively participate. The 17 actual participants came from 15 different Consent partner institutions in 13 different EU Member States. The vast majority were students of political

science, but there were also 2 students of business studies/economics and 3 students of law. On the whole this constituted a very diverse mix of different backgrounds that was nevertheless no barrier to good discussions in the seminars.

Programme

The programme had been put together jointly by WP IV and WP XI, with WP IV providing speakers on subjects of relevance to the theme on 4 days, and WP XI contributing speakers on 4 May. With one exception, the speakers came with a background in Political Science. On the whole the programme was positively received and the format - a combination of invited lectures by senior scholars and student presentations followed by discussant comments and open discussion - can be seen as a success. The balance between invited speakers and student presentations was regarded as good, and also all participants appreciated to present their own work.

Summary

On the whole, it is fair to say that the first PhD school can be regarded as a success, both in terms of the quality of the contributions, the reception among the participants and the impact that the event is expected to have on the networking among the participants (and others) in the future.



Ionut SASU: The Co-decision Procedure: Effective and Legitimate?

Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU's democratic legitimacy was a major issue in the debate on European integration. A commonplace topic in the study of the EU institutions is that they lack the legitimacy the European constituencies confer to their national political systems. The underlying assumption is that the representative democracy is a valid model at both national and European level, which is problematic from a normative standpoint as the EU is neither a state, nor a classic international organization and, as such, it cannot replicate the national patterns at a supranational level. The heterogeneity of a polity in which the popular allegiance, in the absence of a strong collective identity, belongs primarily to the national state shows the limits of the majoritarian system model.

The "normative turn in EU studies" (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003) has largely focused on how the EU institutions should be governed. Many normative theorists claimed that the negative popular responses and legal challenges to the Maastricht Treaty were symptoms of a legitimacy deficit, posing a significant threat to future integration and enlargement. Some others argue that the EU does not suffer from a

legitimacy deficit (Moravcsik 2002, Majone 1998) but by the perception of it (Banchoff and Smith 1999). The legitimacy deficit was described either as lack of procedural 'input' legitimacy granted by citizens' influence or as lack of 'output' legitimacy due to mismatches between citizens' preferences and politicians' delivery, either as lack of measures of accountability or as lack of capacity of the Member-States to fulfill the citizens' goals (Scharpf 1999).

Claims that the EU suffers from a 'democratic deficit' have been made both by Euro-federalists who would like to see the Parliament gain more power in its relations to the other institutions of the EU, and by Euro-sceptics who claim that a supranational Europe is infringing on member states' sovereignties. Discontentment with the present state of affairs and its deficits in terms of legitimacy procedures and outputs have essentially compelled EU actors and institutions to improve the public perception of their legitimacy. The EU constitution-making process has started from this consensus on the need to democratise the EU and to base it on a specific form of justification in line with the generally approved normative principles of a democratic social and political order.



This paper examines public euroscepticism: a phenomenon powerful enough to alter the course of integration in the European Union, but elusive enough to have escaped any clear definition. The paper's objectives are twofold. It adopts an empirical approach to further the argument that recent years have witnessed a marked change in the geography of scepticism, where countries previously labelled eurosceptic are becoming new yes-sayers, and countries previously known as cheerleaders are turning sceptical. The EU's great project of the past decade, Eastern Enlargement, is taken as the yardstick for this development, and Denmark, France and the United Kingdom are used as cases. But concept clarification stands prior to data analysis. The paper therefore begins by offering a three-level structuration of the concept of euroscepticism through a theoretical inquiry into its various constitutive dimensions. Focus is on aggregate public opinion in the 15 old member states as well as on establishing relative scepticism (i.e. scepticism compared to the EU-average). The aim of this study of euroscepticism, in other words, is to contribute to on-going debates on the nature of the alleged gap between citizens and the EU, rather than to predict when citizens are 'sceptical enough' to vote no in a EU-referendum.

The current position in our fellow democratic countries clearly establishes the demand for:

- A democratic and participative Administration whose political values are relationship-oriented and which addresses the complexity and diversity of competitive forces or interest groups;
- A balanced and competitive Administration which collaborates with other public and private organizations, is adapted to the needs of society and the general environment and is flexible, forward-thinking, intelligent, thoughtful, innovative and adaptive;
- A responsive Administration which is able to correct its mistakes, learn from experience and is sensitive to environmental forces, both internally and externally, is able to develop and consolidate structures and comprehensive action plans and is always focused on achieving its vision, mission, objectives and goals; and finally,
- An effective, efficient and quality Administration which focuses on and moves political decision-making and its activity closer to the citizen and is, therefore, more democratic.



Such a change requires a different notion of the organization and its functions, structure and culture, strategic direction and public management, funding, human resources and knowledge management, processes of service provision to the citizen and relationship with the environment and its agents, technologies and systems.

This paper aims to shed light on the principal challenges facing intelligent Public Administration at the service of the citizen in democratic societies.

Daniel KLIMOVSKÝ : The Members of the European Parliament from the New Member States (the Countries of V4) - Who Are They, and Who Do They Stand in for?

The countries of the Visegrad Four (V4) succeeded in their effort to become fully-fledged members of the European Union in May 2004. In June of the same year the citizens of these countries could use the opportunity to choose and elect their representatives who should stand in for them and formulate the policies which are in compliance with their voters' interests.

These Members of the European Parliament from the new member countries have consequently become the members of the highest political elite in their mother countries. Such strong, powerful, and prestigious positions guarantee not only public concern over their activities but also an intrapersonal potential conflict because on the one

hand, they obtained a right to stand in the European Parliament for their voters on the other hand they began to represent the interests and aims of both their mother countries and political parties as well as political groups in the European Parliament. Moreover, a recent history of politics in the most of these countries has essentially different roots in comparison with politics which is typical in the "classical" Western European countries because after a collapse of previous political regimes under the rules of Communist Parties they were confronted with a necessity to consolidate and stabilize the conditions of their polities. With respect to these ideas, it seems absolutely fascinating to find out, who are these persons, and who do they stand in for.

Therefore, in my paper I am dealing with a response to some questions in regard to the new Members' of the European Parliament political origin and career as well. Beside the brief country studies I utilize especially a comparative approach that is able to put us on to the different and identical characteristics the new Members of the European Parliament in terms of the individual countries. As far as methodology, I primarily use an analysis of secondary data that have origin in the curriculum vitae of the mentioned politicians. At this point I have to stress that it is only a small part of research, however because of an extent of this paper, I am going to deal just with the mentioned part.



My main aim is to find out both identical and different points which can help us to respond a fundamental issue of this paper: *“Who are the Members of the European Parliament and who do they stand in for?”*.

Jan HAUSER: Subsidiarity - Myth or Reality of Today's EU?

Whether we consider the European integration a political process or an economic development based on spill-over effect, whether we are euro-federalists or euro-sceptics, we have to admit that there are processes within the European integration process which are real and that there are many other which could be described as political myths.

One of the most important principles on which the EU is supposed to be built is the principle of subsidiarity. Is this principle a vague political phrase or is subsidiarity a corner-stone of the whole integration process?

And beyond, does this mean that there are important political actors influencing the European Union below the level of European institutions and nation states? Do and can the regions, municipalities and other local actors of Europe play an important role in influencing the course of events in all levels and areas that the European Union covers?

**Milena BIGATTO :
Euro-parliamentary socialisation” of
the new MEPs and creation of
European political elite**

In the 2004, several months before the date of the fifth European elections, the new member states' parliaments selected their national representatives to European Parliament (EP). As in the previous enlargements the European Council established temporary rules for the EP composition in order a general time schedule of the other European institutions. In this period the new members improved their national structures and in June elected the European parliamentarians to the world's largest democratically elected parliamentary chamber.

Two processes, the euro-parliamentary socialisation of the new MEPs by the EP and the innovation of EP institutionalisation by the Eastern traditions are two internal processes that will have important consequences on two macro phenomena: on one hand the creation of European political elite, and on the other hand the constitutionalisation of the EU political system. I would like to analyse if the EP structures are able to “euro-parlamentarise” the new parliamentarians and if this process affect the European political elite building. After a brief explanation about the general features of socialization process, I analyse some preliminary data about four indicators – committee membership, rapporteurs' appointment,



group coordinators and Intergroups membership – in order to understand if the new MEPs are involved in the parliamentary activities. Finally I propose some suggestions from the data analysis.

Beatrix FUTAK-CAMPBELL:
Constructing european neighbourhood policy - an analysis of the european parliament's position.

This paper considers the way the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is constructed and viewed during parliamentary Question Time at the European Parliament (EP) by parliamentarians, members of the Council and the Commission. The findings demonstrate that the EP indeed exercises its scrutiny and budgetary powers in order to validate its role in foreign policy affairs; furthermore, that there is a lack of clarity as to what makes a country European and that the ENP is constructed as the alternative to EU membership.

Firstly, this paper will give a brief introduction to the neighbourhood policy. Subsequently it will seek to establish the importance of the EP in the European Union's foreign affairs. Then, it will justify the methodological underpinnings of this research. Finally, it will provide empirical evidence through analysing discursive resources made relevant by members of the European Parliament,

representatives of the Council and the Commission by demonstrating the function, construction and variability of their accounts of the ENP as part of the ongoing social practice. Furthermore, it will confirm the ways in which these discursive resources filtered through to ENP policy making practices despite the EP not having direct competence over foreign policy.

Mitja DURNIK: **Irrationality of the »New Border Debate« Between Slovenia and Croatia. Is Here Any Relevant Policy Space for the European Union's Intervention?**

Slovenian and Croatian governments have not a strategy (concept) what kind of bilateral relations should have in the near future. From the very beginning of the independence of both states, a series of mistakes have been made that rendered foreign policy inconsistent. A conflict about the state border is not unresolved, but politicians use the symbol of a border for short-term political goals and make general public confused. Out of it, a real obstacle in relationship has evolved through all this time - irrational political discourse with elements of demagoguery and populism. The main goal of a paper is to show a capacity of a rational approach that could offer some potential solutions of mentioned border conflict.



Kasia LACH: These Unruly Eastern Europeans and the European Court of Justice - the Supremacy/Direct Effect Doctrine Called into Question Again?

In assessing the impact of the recent Eastern enlargement on the institutions of the European Union it is vital to investigate the extent to which this development might affect or, indeed, has already affected, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In a broad sense, the Eastern Enlargement has had a twofold impact upon the ECJ. Firstly, it has profoundly affected the administration of justice on the European level by changing the composition of the ECJ as well as by considerably increasing its workload. Secondly, it has given the ECJ an opportunity to revisit its controversial relationship with national Constitutional Courts. The following paper will concentrate on the second dimension—the ways in which EU law and the ECJ have been conceptualised in “new” Member States. The issue is particularly important for the reason that it might be viewed as symptomatic of the existing uneasy relationship between supranational and national institutional actors. Further, it might be argued that this tension is not necessarily confined solely to the “new” Member States. The paper will address these issues by examining the “European” jurisprudence of the two Constitutional Courts from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)—the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. Firstly, I am going to make a few preliminary remarks concerning the nature of the

institutional actors and the subject matter. Against this background, I will analyse the decisions of Hungarian and Polish courts respectively. This will be followed by a section in which I will try to summarise the judgements and reflect upon their possible effects on the ECJ and EU in general.

Moritz KILGER: The Way of Hungary to the Euro - Detecting (and Removing?) the Practical and Theoretical Stumbling Blocks

Since having joined the EU on 1 May 2004, the ten NMS have participated in European Monetary Union with the status of ‘Member States with a derogation’. This means that they are committed to join the Euro area at a later stage having complied with the Convergence Criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the CEECs have been engaged in an impressive transformation process from centrally planned to market economies and achieved great strides in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation. The transition process has let the economies converge towards the EU-15 in a number of economic indicators and the countries have become more integrated with the EU, with the major part of trade now occurring with the Old Member States. Nevertheless, the countries still display some fundamental economic differences from the EU-15 which may hinder their adoption of the single currency. On one hand, the obstacles are a result of different economic pasts. In particular,



the income per-capita and the productivity levels are still low relative to the longer standing members of the EU, current account deficits are high and the financial sector is relatively underdeveloped. On the other hand, however, the problems are partly 'home made' and it seems that some of the CEECs have rapidly inherited some 'bad manners'. associated with the Old Member States, resulting in deteriorating public finances for example. Therefore, the road to the Euro will pose a significant challenge to the governments of these countries. Analysing the CEECs journey to the Euro area is thus an academically fruitful task, especially the case of Hungary, since it fulfils currently *none* of the Convergence Criteria and moreover displays some worrying structural economic weaknesses, which, if not tackled at the right time, could jeopardise macroeconomic stability as well as successful participation in EMU in the long run. The paper is organized as follows. Before addressing the Hungarian economy in chapter 3, it starts with a discussion of the principal approach of economic theory on monetary integration, the 'Theory of Optimum Currency Areas'. However, a comprehensive analysis of the theory would be not only beyond the boundaries of this paper, but would prove unnecessary for our purposes. Therefore, the paper restricts itself to some selected and for our aims relevant aspects of the theory. Nevertheless, the chapter tries to reveal that economic theory has, despite an attempt lasting

four decades, failed to give a clear-cut and consistent answer to the question: 'When are countries ready to join monetary union?' Section 3 is dedicated to main features of the Hungarian economy and identifies labour market policies and the stance of public finances in Hungary as the main stumbling blocks the country will face on its path to EMU.

Joachim ÅHMAN: European Integration and Safeguard Measures : and Procedural Change	European Emergency Enlargement
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In the European Community (EC), the markets of the member states constitute a common market and the use of trade defence instruments belong to the exclusive competence of the community. Consequently, it is not possible for members to use such instruments against each other, nor is it possible for them to act on their own against non-member countries.

For the ten new member states the accession process has thus entailed a great change, as competence has been transferred from national institutions to community institutions. One of the trade defence instruments mentioned above is the so-called *safeguard measure*, also known as the "safety valve" of free trade. A safeguard measure is a temporary protection, in the form of an increased tariff or a quota, which can be used in certain economic emergency situations – when increased imports of certain products causes injury to domestic producers – to facilitate



adjustment of non-competitive industries. The right to use safeguard measures is a part of the regulatory framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the relevant provisions can be found in Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the Agreement on Safeguards (AoS). Moreover, all twenty-five EC member states are WTO members and the EC, in the capacity of a customs union, has a membership of its own. Therefore, the EC and the member states are bound by the WTO rules, and the EC rules on trade defence instruments could thus be regarded as an implementation of WTO rules. The purpose of this paper is to use the safeguard measure as an example to illuminate, from a legal point of view, how the possibility to use a trade defence instrument has changed for the new EC member states as their markets have become integrated with the common market of the EC. Due to space limits the paper will focus on the procedural provisions, and not elaborate on the legal interpretations of the material provisions. The main purpose is to enthrone the major differences between the provisions applicable during the pre-accession period, during the accession period and today. The procedural provisions are important for a number of reasons. Mainly because they are supposed to ensure that safeguard measures taken by states fulfil the legal requirements, that all interested parties have had a possibility to present their views, and thus influence the decision,

and that the relevant institutional bodies have had a possibility to monitor the use of the measures. A measure taken wrongly may entail great negative consequences, like trade distortion, higher prices for the consumers and costly disputes with other states.

Moreover, some of the conclusions reached in the paper will hopefully be of general interest, as they will not only be applicable to the case of European integration, but also to market integration through free trade areas elsewhere in the world. The paper is divided into six chapters, of which this introduction is the first one. The second chapter will give a short background to the regulatory framework of the WTO and the main principles. The third chapter will examine how a WTO member not connected to the EC, or other free trade agreements, should act when using safeguard measures. The fourth chapter will examine how the ten new EC member states have had to act when using safeguard measures during the accession process. The fifth chapter will examine how an EC member state can act to initiate a safeguard measure against non-member countries, and in the sixth and final chapter some conclusions will be drawn.



Andreas MOBERG: EU and Human Rights Conditionality- How do we tell if some states are more equal than others?

Since the early 1990s, the European Community, and later on, the European Union, has worked with a legal construction, a specific *conditionality-clause*, as an instrument to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In 1995, a commission initiative led to the adoption of a uniform clause to be inserted into all drafts of external agreements. At present, this uniform clause is in force between the EC and about 150 "third countries". The clause stipulates that the parties to the agreement at hand adheres themselves to the respect of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and that a breach of said rights will entitle the other party to suspend or terminate the agreement. As a bargaining tool, the clause has proved fairly efficient, especially in a "negative conditionality" context. The EU has used the possibility to suspend its obligations to certain third countries, especially under the Lomé- and Cotonou agreements, on several occasions during the last decade. As a means to have third countries ameliorate not only their formal, constitutional respect for human rights, but also their real, *de facto* respect, the conditionality clause has definitely had an impact. However, the application of a legal construction such as a conditionality clause comes with an inherent aspect of legal principles such as the principle of equality, which in this context means "equal application in similar cases". The

EU-policy of using conditionality has been *Moberg EU and Human Rights Conditionality 2* criticized for applying double standards. The obvious questions have been voiced over and over again: Why Togo and not Algeria, or Israel? Why Haiti and not Indonesia, or China? Are some states more equal than others? One way to investigate whether the application of the conditionality clause is free from bias towards certain countries or not, is through conducting an empirical study of the actual cases where the clause has been applied. In order to remedy any kind of dual-standard application, or at least to explain and unmask it if it would be found, a method to measure violations of human rights, democratic principles or the principle of the rule of law is needed. With a legitimate method, violations in one country could be compared to those conducted in another country, which would make it possible to justify the evaluation of one instance of violations as more serious than the other. In this paper I will investigate whether the use of "indicators" could be a useful tool for such a task. I will start by defining the problem. Then I will present a background on the theory behind human rights indicators. Having done that, I will turn the focus to the EU human rights conditionality setting, and apply the indicators theory to that setting.



Christina Olsen Lundh : Some Aspects of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity

In January 2005 the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) commenced operation. Emissions Trading is a market based instrument with the ultimate intention to curb greenhouse gas emissions in a cost effective way aiming to contribute to the European Community's and its Member States' fulfilling of their commitments to the Kyoto protocol.

This paper is dealing with an environmental issue which seems to require market harmonization, primarily *not* for the achievement of the establishing of the internal market, but for preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment.

In this background I will first give a general background to EU ETS, and then describe some of the market issues that the EU ETS gives rise to and finally a description of the purpose with this paper.

Pierpaolo Settembri: The impact of the enlargement on the European Parliament

Like (perhaps even more than) other EU institutions, also the European Parliament (EP) is exposed to robust pressures as the EU expands its membership to 25, soon 27 states.

Taking into account the methodological challenges that these studies embody, this paper endorses a general analytical framework proposed to account for the institutional impact of the enlargement and adapts this approach to the study of the EP. Whilst shedding light on most aspects of the EP in EU 25 will require new research to be conducted, certain quantitative and qualitative data made available in the last few months are used to respond to some of the queries raised by the research question. At the same time, the article indicates the remaining steps to take for a more comprehensive assessment of the impact of the enlargement on the EP.



Daniela Kietz: What accounts for national divergence: The Baltic Parliaments in EU Affairs

The participation of national parliaments in EU decision making and their role in diminishing the democratic deficit of the EU has been a popular subject in the academia and in politics recently. There is plenty of literature on the how the parliaments of the EU-15 scrutinize their government representatives in Council negotiations and thereby help to legitimise decisions taken at EU level. However, little is known about the activities of the parliaments of the new Member States in EU affairs. Which models of parliamentary scrutiny did they set up after joining the EU in 2004? Regarding their powers in scrutinizing government in EU affairs, how do they integrate into the classifications set up for the parliaments of the old Member States? This paper has a twofold aim. First it wants to give detailed information how the parliamentary scrutiny systems for EU affairs work in the Baltic parliaments. The information will be analysed and evaluated on the basis of criteria for national parliamentary scrutiny in the EU-15. Second, these parliaments which just newly established their scrutiny systems for EU affairs, offer the opportunity to control for the influence of a number of systemic variables at national level that are supposed to determine the extent of

parliamentary scrutiny but have so far not been subjected to empirical testing. The paper is divided into four parts. First, a short overview is given of how parliaments participate in EU affairs and which criteria can be used to analyse their participation. A second part then introduces three variables which are supposed to influence the degree of parliamentary scrutiny and the related assumptions. In the last part the actual scrutiny procedures of the Baltic parliaments are examined (based on the criteria introduced in Section 1) to finally draw conclusions for the assumptions spelled out in part two.

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Catharina Sorensen: Types of Euroscepticism

This paper forwards and substantiates the proposition that euroscepticism is a multifaceted phenomenon. Its hypothesis is that aggregate-level public scepticism towards the EU-of-the-day in Denmark, France and the United Kingdom (UK) assumes forms that, if not contradictory, are so diverse that we should be sceptical about the success of any endeavour to address eurosceptics with one message. The paper suggests that to some types of euroscepticism, the EU's communication plans, such as the newly invigorated Plan D , may even



prove counterproductive. Four distinct dimensions of euroscepticism are discerned from existent literature and examined over time in the three member states through Eurobarometer polls.

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**Emanuelle Schön-Quinvilan:
Preparing for EU enlargement: an analysis of the institutional change and administrative reform in the European Commission**

The European Commission of the European Union is a relatively recent creation by international public administration standards. It was officially born on 1 January 1958 when the Treaty of Rome came into force, but was modelled on the 1952 High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Taking into account the Commission's complex organisational structure and cultural aspect, this article focuses on its changing institutional dynamic with regards administrative organisation since 1958. The literature on the Commission (Morgan, 1992; Berlin, 1987; Pisani, 1956; Caremier, 1997) which revolves around the duality in its functions and identity, traditionally opposes two concepts when analysing the institution: the *administration de mission* which is entirely dedicated to the achievement of European integration with the *administration de gestion* which is not teleological and emerged over the years from the growth in size and areas of competence of the European Commission. According to these authors, the European Commission has evolved

from an *administration de mission* to an *administration de gestion* over time, as a result of the constantly growing number of new programmes that the institution has had to run.

After setting the European administration in the current literature context (1), the author will justify the use of a historical institutionalist approach in order to analyse the Commission's institutional change (2). Finally, through Bulmer and Burch's institutional gradations, path dependencies, critical junctures as well as a process-based adaptive momentum in the history of the construction of the European administration will be identified (3). Many authors argue that the European Commission has constructed itself as an *administration de mission*. This article will however contend that the European Commission has consisted of both types of administration, *mission* and *gestion*, from its conception, one type of administration taking precedence over the other in a cyclical way depending on systemic circumstances. Over fifty years it can be concluded that the lessons about institutional change and administrative reform in the European Commission do not lie in the administration's formal institutional structure but in its cultural and normative development.

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